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Summary 
We  present  an  algorithm  for  solving  S-Games.  Our 
algorithm  can  be  used to compute  approximately  the 
value  of  the  game  as  well  as  €-optimal  strategies  of 
the  two  players. For  games  with  similar  structure  to 
S-games  which  do not necessarily  possess  a  value,  the 
algorithm can  sometimes  be  used  as  a  heuristic  proce- 
dure  for  determining  the  existence  of a minimax 
solution.  Further, it  is  shown that a  certain  simple 
class of differential  games  (we  call  them  "differen- 
tial  S-games")  can  be  viewed  as  static  games  and  solved 
by  the  above  procedure. 
1. Introduction 
We  shall  consider a two-person,  zero-sum  game 
played as follows: Player P2 chooses a point s in  a 
compact  set S in  Rn  while  player P chooses  a  coordinate 
i of  Rn. The  payoff  to P1 is  the ith coordinate s of 
s. Such  games  were  first  studied  by  Blackwell  and 
Girshick [2], pp. 47-51  and are  often  referred  to as 
S-games. 
i 
In  this  note  we  present  an  algorithm  (Section 2) 
for  approximately  computing  the  value  and  E-optimal 
strategies,  for  both  players in an  S-game.  Our  algo- 
rithm  reduces  the  problem  to  a  sequence  of  minimization 
problems.  Thus  the  computational  strength  of  the 
procedure  is  determined  by  the  strength  of  the  existing 
techniques  for  solving  the  associated  minimum  problems. 
If  the  set S is  not  known  to  be  compact  our  algorithm 
can lead  to a heuristic  procedure  for  testing  the 
existence  of  the  value. 
We  expect  that  one  fruitful  area  of  application 
for  our  algorithm  will  be  that  of  finding  solutions  for 
what  we  call  "Differential  S-Games."  These  are  differ- 
ential  games  in  which  only  one  player  (the  minimizer) 
controls  the  law of motion,  while  the  other  player  can 
decide  only  which  out  of  a  fixed  number  of  functionals 
will  be  used  to  compute  the  payoff.  Thus  a  differential 
S-game is an essentially  control  theoretic  problem3 
complicated  by  the  uncertainity  as  to  which  performance 
index is being  used  during  the  process. In  Section 3 
we show  that  under  suitable  assumptions  these  games  can 
be  analyzed  as  S-games,  and  consequently  that  our 
algorithm can be  applied. Of course,  the effectiveness 
of the algorithm  will  now  depend  on  our  ability  to  solve 
the  associated  sequence  of  optimal  control  problems. A
simple  example  is  given  in  Section 4 .  
2. An Algorithm  for  S-Games 
Let ? be  an  S-game  as  described  in  the  introduc- 
tion.  For  such a game  Blackwell  and  Girshick [2] estab- 
3For  an  introduction  to  the  theories of differential 
games  and  optimal  control we refer  the  reader  to  Isaacs, 
151 and  Berkowitz 111, respectively. 
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lished  the  following  result. 
Theorem 2.1. The  game  has  a  value, v(r). Both  players 
have  optimal  randomized  strategies  and  further,  player 
P possesses  an  optimal  strategy  which  randomizes on at 
most  n  points  of S. 2 
We shall  now  outline  a  procedure  which  shows  that 
within  some EX), an  approximation to the  value  and  to 
E-optimal  strategies  for  both  players  can  be  obtained 
by  solving a sequence  of  appropriate  matrix  games,  and 
a  corresponding  sequence  of  minimization  problems.  Our 
algorithm is  a  generalization  of  Troutt's (see  181, pp. 
343-345) algorithm  for  non-convex s -games. 
Let X = (X, ... X ) be  an  arbitrary  probability  vec- 
tor,  and  define  for  each s E S 
n 
i=l 
H(X,s) = 1 xisi. (1) 
Here si = ith coordinate  of s .  Our  algorithm  will  be 
as  powerful as our  ability  to  solve  the  following  mini- 
mization  problem: 
minimize H (X, s )  . (2) 
S E S  
In  the  next  two  sections  it  will  be  seen  that  this 
algorithm  is  potentially  at  least,  applicable  to  a 
large class  of problems. 
Notation:  If P uses a strategy X = ( A  l...Xn)  and P2 
uses a strategy q = (ql..  .qk) on the  points s1,s2,. . .s 
of S (i.e., chooses  sj  with  probability Q.), then the 
1 
k 
1 
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expected  payoff  is  simply 
where s; = ith  coordinate  of s j  . Further,  let A(s ,s , 1 2  
. . . , s ) be  an  nxk  matrix  whose  jth  column is  the  point k 
s j  E S. Also,  let v (A)  stand  for  the  value of a  matrix 
game A. 
The  Algorithm 
Step 1. [Initialization]. For each coordi- 
nate i = lr2, ..., n solve the  minimization  problem  (2) 
with X = e the  ith  vector of  the standard  basis  of Rn. 
This  yields  a  set  of  n  points  in S, say, 5 , E  ,...,En. 
Now  construct  the  matrix  A1 = (C1,C2,. . . ,<"),  and  com- 
pute  its  value, v(A ) and a pair of optimal  strategy 
if 1 2  
1 
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v e c t o r s  A1 and q1 f o r  p l a y e r s  P1 and  P2 i n  t h e  m a t r i x  
game A . 1 
s t e p  2 .  Solve  the  minimization  problem ( 2 )  w i t h  
X = ),I. T h i s  y i e l d s  a p o i n t  s2 s u c h  t h a t  H (i, ,s ) = 
min H(?L1,s). I f  H ( A 1 , s 2 )  = v(A 1 ,  stop.   Otherwise,  
c o n s t r u c t  t h e  m a t r i x  game 
1 2  
1 
A' = A 1 ( c 1 , c 2 ,  .. . ,cn,s2)  and s c l v e  it. 
S tep  3 .  Repeat  Step i wi th  X = 1' (x2 i s  t h e  Pi's 
o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g y  i n  A ) ,  and so on. 2 
The above procedure generates a sequence of 
s o l u t i o n s  v ( A m ) ,  t o   t h e   m a t r i x  games Am as w e l l   a s  
a sequence of  points  tl,. . . ,; , 5 ,s , s  , . . . , i n  S .  
The relat ionship between these sequences and the 
s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  game i s  s u m a r i z e d  i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t .  
rn 2 3 4  
Theorem 2 . 2 .  
(i) I f  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  t e r m i n a t e s  i n  k i t e r a t i o n s ,  
then  v( ' )  = V ( A  ) , A  , F k a r e o 2 t i n a l   f O r F   a n d F 2 ,  7 i s  
t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a randomizat ion on the points  of  S 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  columns  of A . 
k k  k 
1 
k 
(ii) v(A ) + v ( r )  a s  k +. m. 
( i i i ) G i v e r .  E > 0 ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  
k 
M s u c h  t h a t  >?,Urn are E-optimal f o r  p l a y e r s  P1 and P2 
f o r   a l l  m _> X. 
Proof.  -
(i) The a lgo r i thm  t e rmina t ing   i n  k s t e p s  means 
t n a t  H(.ik,s) _> v(A ) f o r  a l l  s 6 S.  But @(?.,rl 2 
v(A ) f o r  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  v e c t o r s  J. s i n c e  qk is  opt imal  
i n  t h e  m a t r i x  game A . 
k k 
k 
k 
(ii) I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
H ( i k , S k c 1 )  = min H ( x ~ , ~ )  5 v ( ~ ) .  
S 
s i n c e  Xk+l i s  o_ctimal i n   t h e   m a t r i x  game A and k + l  
s i n c e  v ( r )  _< v ( A ~ + ' )  we h a v e  t h a t  f o r  e v e r y  k 
whenever 5 E { E ' , .  . . , E  , S  , s  ,. . . s  . . Since  the  n 2 3  k+l,. 
v e c t o r s  Xk a r e   p r o b d o i l i t l -   v e c t o r s ,  fiJ+' ii cc + 3  
f o r  some subsequence {Xk'J}t=l. Thus f r o n  ( 4 )  we o b t a i n  
3 < - v(Ak'J+l) - v ( - )  - < H(Xk..+l,sk.~+l)-H(Xk,,,sk.)+l) 
Hence v (Ak.'') -f v (?I a s  + m. Since  v(A ) + l i m i t ,  
t i is  l i m i t  m u s t  be v(:). 
k 
(iii) The f a c t  t h a t  r," becomes E-optimal randomized 
s t r a t e g y  f o r  F2 f o r  m s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  f o l l o w s  
immediately  from (ii),  s i n c e  P1 h a s  n o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
p l aced  on  h in  in  the  ma t r ix  ganes  A". 
For  p layer  P1, assume t h a t  t h e r e  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  a 
p o s i t i v e  i n t e q e r  M s u c h  t h a t  (iii) i s  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  a l l  
m 2 M .  T h i s   i m p l i e s   t h a t   t h e r e   e x i s t s  a subsequence 
{ m r j F l  o f  p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r s  s u c h  t h a t  f o r  e v e r y  r ,  
.m 
Fur ther ,  the  subsequence  of  probabi l i ty  vec tors  {,.mrr=l 
must  have a convergent  subsequence.  without loss of 
g e n e r a l i t y  assume t h a t  i/>."r - A' / I m  -f 0 a s  r +. m. 
NOW it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  t o  f i n d  r and L s u c h  t h a t  m < m 
and 
r k  
Now u s i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
we ob ta in  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  (6), namely 
L! 
we s h a l l  now b r i e f l y  d i s c u s s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  where 
t h e  s e t  S i s  no t  known to  be  compact .  I t  could  happep 
t h a t  t h e  game s t i l l  possesses  a minimax s o l u t i o n ,  and 
our algorithm could sometimes s t i l l  be  use fu l  a s  a 
h e u r i s t i c   p r o c e d u r e   f o r   " g u e s s i n g "   t h e   s o l u t i o n .   T h i s  
is  a consequence of  the fol lowing resul t  which can be 
very  eas i ly  proved .  
Corol lary  2 .3 .   Consider   an "5-game" i n  which S i s  nclt 
necessar i ly   compact .   Let  e k  = v(A ) and  suppose t h a t  
6 = min H ( ? . k , s )  e x i s t s   f o r   e v e r y  k .  I f  the  sequences 
{$,},=, and {gk}" converge t o  a comron limit 3 ,  t hen  
t h e   v a l u e   e x i s t s  and equa l s  9. Thus the   a lgo r i tnm Of 
Theorem 2 . 2  s t i l l  y ie lds  an  approximate  SClUtiOn. 
Remark 2.4.  Note t n a t  as soon as our  algorithm  pro- 
duces   an   i n t e rva l  Gk,$]  which i s  small  and ' which 
i s  near  e,, we a r e   i n   p o s s e s s i o n   o f  a p a i r  (A , q  ) of  
reasonably good s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  P1 and  F2 i n  t h e  
fol lowing  sense:  The expected  gain  of P1 w i l l  be a t  
l e a s t  Skel when he uses  ;%k+l whi le  the  expec ted  loss of 
F will be no more than ck when he uses  . With  such 
a F a i r  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  a t  hand, the question of whether 
t h e  v a l u e  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t s  may be of l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t .  
- k 
-k 0: s 
k = l  
th+' k 
k 
2 
3. A C l a s s  o f  D i f f e r e n t i a l  S-Games 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we in t roduce  a s p e c i a l  c l a s s  o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  games which can be a n a l y z e d  a s  s t a t i c  
S-games and hence we s h a l l  c a l l  them D i f f e r e n t i a l  
S-Games. Such a game can  a l so  be  viewed a s  a g m e  
between a c o n t r o l l e r  i n  t h e  u s u a l  c o n t r o l  t h e o r e t i c  
sense and an antagonistic oFponent who can decide which 
o f  t h e  f i n i t e l y  many poss ib le  payoff  func t iona ls  w i l l  
b e   u s e d   t o  compute t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  loss .  That   choice 
of t t e  payoff  funct ional  remains unknown u n t i l  t h e  end 
o f   t he  game. More p r e c i s e l y ,  we cons ide r  a d i f f e r e n t i a l  
Game 7 with R" a s  state  space played by  two p laye r s  P 
F ove r   t he   f i xed   t ime   i n t e rva l  I = [3,11. A t  each 
t ime t E I ,  F p i c k s  a n  e l e n e n t  v ( t )  from a Compact 
subse t  v of RL in  such  a way t h a t   v ( t )  i s  measurable. 
Player  pl ,  on the  o ther  hand ,  p icks  out  a number i 
from t h e   s e t  N = { l , ~ , .  . ,n3 a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  of t h e  
1' 
2 
2 
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game. 
The "law  of  motion"  of  the game  is  specified  by 
the  differential  equation 
dx - =  dt f(t,x,v(t)). ( 9 )  
Here  x E Rm  and f: I  x R x V + Rm  is  a  continous m 
function  satisfying  a  Lipschitz  condition 
The  law  of  motion  is  given  by 
whenever  x1,x2 E Rm,  t E I, v E V; K is  some  fixed 
positive  number. 
The  equation  (9)  now  has  a  unique  solution  x  (t) 
corresponding  to  any  given  initial  condition x(0) = x 
the  resulting  solution  shall  be  called  the  trajectory 
corresponding  to  v(*).  We  may  now  compute  the  payoff 
H(i,v)  which  P  will pay to  P1  at  the  end of the  game, 
by 
0; 
2 
H(i,v) = io h(t,x(t),i,v(t))  dt. 
Here h: I x Rm x N x V + R  is  a  continuous  uniformly 
bounded  function. 
1 (11) 
We shall  associate  with  every  pure  control  the n-
component  vector 
H(V) = (H(l,v),H(z,v), ..., H(n,v)). 
It is  shown  in 141 that  the  set v of pure  controls  can 
be  chosen so that  the  set 
S={fj(v) j v E  VI 
is  a  compact  set  in R". 
It is  now  clear  that  our  game  is  equivalent to  an 
S-game  as  formulated in Section 1. Namely,  player P2 
chooses  a  point s of  a  compact  set S in Rn while  player 
P  chooses  a  coordinate  i  of Rn. The  payoff  to P1 is 
the ith coordinate  si  of s ,  that  is,  H(i,v) . 
1 
Let X = (Xl. ..A ) be  a  probability  vector,  and 
define  for  every  v E v 
The  algorithm  of  Section  2  is  now  applicable  to 
the  differentials-game  and  will  be  as  powerful  as  our 
ability  to  solve  the  following  optimal  control  problem 
in pure controls: 
minimize H (X,v) 
v E  v 
subjectto: - = f(t,x(t),v(t)), X(O) = x dx dt 0' (13) 
4. A Simple  Example 
We  shall  now  illustrate  the  working  of our algo- 
rithm.  The  example  solved  below  shows  that  this  algo- 
rithm  can  sometimes  yield  approximate  optimal  solutions 
even in games  which  do  not  precisely  fit  the  theory  of 
Sections  2  and  3,  provided  that  the  conceptual  ingre- 
dients of an S-game  are  present. 
Player P1 has  only  two  choices, 1 or  2  and 
The expression  (12) of  Section  3  now  becomes 
H(X,v) = I,, 1 [XllOv  2  (t)+X2(X 2 (t)+v 2 (t))ldt.  (15) 
Since  in  this  example  H(X,v)  is  convex  in  v  and  linear 
in A it  follows  from  Sion's  Theorem  [7]  that  we  can 
take v tu  be  the  whole of  L2 [O,l] and  be  assured  that 
the  value exists. In  order  to  apply  our  algorithm  the 
optimal  control  problem  (13)  has  to  be  solvable. If 
the  minimization  in (13) is  taken  over  the  piecewise 
continuous  functions  instead of v then  this  problem 
can  be  solved  by  a  standard  application pf the  Maxi- 
mum Principle  (see  Rozonoer [61 pp.  1291). However, 
since  piecewise  continuous  functions  are  dense  in  L 
[0,13, the  latter  solution  is  also  optimal  for (13). 
2 
That  solution  is  of  the  following form: 
X2 + 
For  any X = (X X ) define  the  constants  y = (- 
1 1' 2 1+9X ' 
1 , A2 = 1 - A1. The  optimal  trajectory  for 
a  particular X (with X >O) is 2 
x (t) = A eyt + A2e-Yt, 
1 
while  the  optimal  control  is  given by 
We shall  now  summarize  the  numerical  results  of  the 
first  five  iterations: 
A5 = [ 0 1.7080 .4268 .9597 .6659 .8055 1 
1 .7616 .8218 .7765 .7952 .7850 j 
I 
The  optimal  strategies  for  players  P1  and P2 in  this 
matrix  game  are X5 = (.0681,  .9319), ri = ( O , O , O , O ,  
.1368, .8632). 
5 
Let jk = H(Ak,vk+') = min H ( X  k ,v)  and e ,  = v(A ) k 
V 
for  k = 1,2,... . 
In  this  example  the  lower  value ek and  the  upper  value 
are  given  by k 
_ek : .7616  .7729  ,7847  , 852  .7862 
Thus  after  five  iterations  we  know  that v(T) lies  in 
the interval I .7862, .78641  (also see Remark  2.4). 
The  vector r- may  be  regarded  as  the  "nearly"  optimal 
set of weights  which  player I1 can  assign  to  the  six 
5 
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pure  controls correspondmg to  the  columns  of A’. The 
exact  expression  for  the  fifth  and  the  sixth of ese 
is obtained  by  substituting the  appropriate  values of 
y, A1 and  A  in  (17). 
2 
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